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This paper analyzes the choice between taxes and cap and trade systems (also 
referred to here as a permit system or a quantity restriction) as methods of 
controlling greenhouse gas emissions. It argues that in the domestic context, with 
proper design, the two instruments are essentially the same. Commonly discussed 
differences in the two instruments are due to unjustified assumptions about 
design. In the climate change context and within a single country there is 
sufficient design flexibility that these differences can be substantially eliminated. 
To the extent that there are remaining differences, there should be a modest 
preference for taxes, but the benefits of taxes are swamped by the benefits of good 
design; even though the very best tax might be better than the very best quantity 
restriction, the first order of business is getting the design right.  
In the international context, however, taxes dominate more strongly. The design 
flexibility available within a single country is reduced in the international context 
because of the problems of coordinating systems across countries and minimizing 
holdouts. Moreover, the incentives to cheat and the effects of cheating are not 
equivalent for the two instruments in the international setting. Because climate 
change will require a global system for emissions, these considerations mean we 
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This paper analyzes the choice between taxes and cap and trade systems as 
methods of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. It argues that within single 
country, commonly discussed differences in the two instruments are due to 
unjustified assumptions about design. In the climate change context and within a 
single country there is sufficient design flexibility that these differences can be 
substantially eliminated. To the extent that there are remaining differences, there 
should be a modest preference for taxes, but the benefits of taxes are swamped by 
the benefits of good design; even though the very best tax might be better than the 
very best quantity restriction, the first order of business is getting the design right.  
In the international context, however, taxes dominate more strongly. The 
design flexibility available within a single country is reduced in the international 
context because of the problems of coordinating systems across countries and 
minimizing holdouts. Moreover, the incentives to cheat and the effects of cheating 
are not equivalent for the two instruments in the international setting. Because 
climate change will require a global system for emissions, these considerations 
mean we should favor taxes for controlling greenhouse gas emissions. 
Nevertheless, the preference should be modest; their remains substantial 
flexibility even internationally and taxes also have coordination and enforcement 
problems.  
Part I provides basic definitions. Part II considers the arguments attributed 
to Weitzman (1974) that taxes and permit systems are different when the 
government is uncertain about the marginal costs of abatement. Weitzman’s 
arguments rely on an assumption that taxes are flat, per-unit taxes, permits are a 
fixed quantity limitation, and neither taxes nor permits can be changed over time 
in response to new information. These assumptions are not correct in the climate 
context. Building on arguments advanced by Kaplow and Shavell (2002), Part II 
shows that with flexible design, uncertainty does not affect the choice of 
instruments.  
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Part III discusses seven additional potential differences between taxes and 
permits in the single-country context. It considers, for example, whether the two 
instruments have different distributional or revenue consequences, whether 
tipping points and environmental certainty should alter the choice, whether permit 
price volatility is a problem, and whether framing effects matter in this context. It 
concludes that these and other claimed differences are most often a result of 
unjustified assumptions about design. With flexibility, both systems will be 
substantially the same along these dimensions. 
Part IV considers the implementation of carbon taxes or cap and trade 
systems internationally. Some of the design flexibility in the domestic context is 
lost once coordination across nations and hold-out problems are considered. In 
particular, in the international context, it might be hard to adjust the tax rate or the 
quantity of permits in response to new information, and taxes perform better in 
the absence of such adjustments. Moreover, the effects of cheating are different 
for taxes and permits and in general are worse for permits. Therefore, there should 
be a modest preference for taxes in the international context. 
Before turning to the discussion, it is worth a word about intuitions about 
domestic political institutions. In analyzing the choice of instruments in the 
single-country context, I am considering a generic market-based economy rather 
than any particular country or any particular time period, such as the United States 
in the early 21
st century. Political institutions and coalitions will vary across 
countries and time periods. If it is the case that a given country in a given time 
period simply will not enact a pricing system with a particular label or feature, 
there is nothing to analyze – the political system will do what it does (although 
there is then room for ingenuity in designing good systems that also meet the 
political constraints). The goal here is instead to analyze the underlying features 
of different instruments emphasizing constraints that apply across countries, such 
as information constraints, the effects of uncertainty, and so forth.  3 
 
I.  Basic Definitions and Terminology  
When individuals or firms emit carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases, 
they impose harm on others.
1 Because the individuals or firms (together, 
polluters) do not have to consider these harms, they emit too much.  
Harm from climate change is a result of the total stock of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere, not the flow. Emissions in a particular year do not matter 
except to the extent they add to the stock. Carbon dioxide also mixes in the 
atmosphere globally; it does not matter where emissions originate, the harm is the 
same. Pre-industrial concentrations of carbon dioxide were about 280 parts per 
million (ppm). Current concentrations are 380 ppm, increasing by around 2 ppm 
per year. Doubling pre-industrial concentrations would likely result in global 
average temperature increases of around 3.5ºC, although the estimate is highly 
uncertain. Most analysts agree that high concentrations, such as 700 ppm or 
higher, would result in severe harm, and typical targets for climate change 
proposals are between 400 to 500 ppm.  
Control of environmental externalities was traditionally done through 
command and control regulations, under which the government specified 
particular technologies or firm-by-firm emissions limitations. Market-based 
instruments, however, are thought to be able to control externalities far more 
cheaply because the government does not have the ability to determine which 
particular technologies are best or which firms should use which technology. 
Market-based instruments utilize private information about firms’ abatement costs 
to minimize total costs. The two chief market-based instruments are taxes and 
quantity restrictions.  
A tax on greenhouse gases would simply be a charge on emissions. A 
polluter, considering whether to emit one more unit of pollution should face a cost 
equal to the harm imposed on others from that additional unit. Polluters, faced 
with a charge equal to the additional harm imposed on others from another unit of 
emissions would adjust their behavior appropriately.  
                                                 
1 There are a large number of gases which contribute to the greenhouse effect including carbon 
dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. Carbon dioxide is the most important. I will refer here to all 
greenhouse cases as carbon dioxide. 4 
 
If marginal harm is not flat – a fixed $x per unit of pollution – the tax 
should vary with marginal harm. For example, if marginal harm increases as 
pollution increases, so should the optimal tax. Similarly, if the government learns 
that the marginal harm is different than it first believed, the tax should be changed 
to reflect the new information.  
Metcalf and Weisbach (2009) consider the design of a carbon tax. They 
show that a carbon tax in the United States could cover 80% of total emissions by 
taxing less than 2,500 entities. The reason is that emissions from fossil fuels make 
up about 80% of U.S. emissions, and these can be taxed upstream on extraction or 
refining without a loss of accuracy. Globally, fossil fuel emissions are around 
67% percent of total emissions, and a global carbon tax could similarly tax these 
emissions upstream.  
Another 14% of global emissions are from agriculture. These emissions 
would be much more difficult to include in a tax system because they come from 
a wide variety of disparate sources, many of which are hard to observe. Taxes on 
inputs, such as nitrogen fertilizer or head of cattle might be the only way to 
include these emissions in the tax base. Deforestation is the third largest source of 
emissions, making up about 12% of global emissions. A tax on deforestation 
would be complex because it would have to be based on deforestation relative to a 
baseline and because the effects of deforestation depend on many factors 
including location, use of the timber, and what replaces the forest. A decision to 
tax agricultural and forestry emissions will depend on the marginal abatement 
costs in these industries and whether there is a reasonably accurate and 
administrable method of including them in the base. 
Design considerations can significantly affect the costs and benefits of a 
tax system. For example, rather than imposing the tax upstream on a small 
number of firms producing or distributing fossil fuels, the government could 
impose the tax downstream on emitters. There are almost 250 million automobiles 
in the United States and no easy way to measure emissions from each vehicle. 
There are also a large number of homes using natural gas for heating. Attempts to 
impose a tax downstream would significantly increase administrative costs, 
reduce the tax base, or both. 5 
 
Quantity restrictions, also called permits or cap and trade systems (I will 
use these terms interchangeably here) limit the total quantity of emissions. The 
government issues permits (either by auctioning them or otherwise allocating 
them) equal to the total amount of emissions is decides is appropriate, usually 
over a given period. Polluters would be required to have a permit in order to 
pollute. Holders of the permits would be allowed to sell them, creating a market in 
permits. Anyone who could reduce emissions for less than the market permit price 
would do so and everyone else would buy a permit, thereby equalizing the 
marginal cost of abatement across all users. If the government issues a quantity of 
permits so that the permit trading price is equal to the marginal harm from 
emissions, polluters would, like in a tax, face a price equal to marginal harm and 
adjust behavior appropriately. 
The number of permits does not have to remain fixed in a cap and trade 
system. The government can change the number of permits over time so that their 
price reflects marginal harm, for example, by buying permits to increase their 
price or selling additional permits to lower their price. Part II will discuss the 
reasons and mechanisms for doing this.  
Stavins (2008) considers the design of a cap and trade system. 
Implementing a cap and trade system raises similar issues to a tax. Issues such as 
determining what emissions to cover and at what level to impose the permit 
requirement (e.g., upstream on fossil fuel production or downstream on emitters) 
are the same for permits as they are for taxes. Quantity restrictions also require a 
trading market and a method of making the initial allocation of permits. 
Taxes and permit systems are equivalent if the government sets the tax 
rate or the number of permits correctly so that in either case the price faced by 
polluters is the marginal harm from emissions. They are, in a sense, duals. In a 
tax, the government sets the price and firms determine quantity subject to that 
price. In a permit system, the government sets the quantity and firms determine 
the price given that quantity. So long as the government has sufficient 
information, it can choose to regulate along either margin, and for every tax, there 
is an equivalent set of permits and vice versa. Moreover, the core implementation 
issues – what emissions to cover and at what level to regulate (e.g., upstream or 
downstream) are the same. For example, a decision to regulate upstream can be 
equivalently made for taxes and permits. The question in the next two sections is 6 
 
what happens when the assumption that the government correctly picks the price 
no longer holds or when we consider more subtle implementation issues. 
II.  Equivalence of Taxes and Permits with Uncertainty about Marginal 
Abatement Costs 
Weitzman (1974) argued that the equivalence between tax and quantity 
restrictions no longer holds when there is uncertainty about the marginal cost of 
abatement because the error costs will be different for taxes and quantity 
limitations.
2 Depending on the relative slopes of the marginal abatement cost 
curve and the marginal harm curve, either taxes or permits might be preferred. 
Virtually every analysis of instrument choice begins with this argument.  
This section argues that Weitzman’s arguments rely on assumptions about 
the design of the systems that are unlikely to hold in the climate change context. 
In particular, Weitzman assumes that taxes are flat, per-unit taxes and that 
quantity limits are fixed caps. In addition, Weitzman assumes that neither the tax 
rate nor the quantity limit is adjusted in response to information showing that they 
were set in error. Weitzman is explicit about these assumptions and makes 
arguments that they are appropriate in the single-polluter context he was 
considering. Nevertheless, these assumptions are rarely mentioned in the literature 
on climate change that builds on Weitzman’s arguments, and as far as I have been 
able to tell, never been defended in the climate context. I will argue that neither of 
these assumptions is appropriate in the climate context, and without both, taxes 
and quantity limits are equivalent.  
The arguments here build on and extend to the climate change context 
arguments made in Kaplow and Shavell (2002). They directly address 
Weitzman’s assumptions that taxes are flat, per-unit taxes, indefinitely fixed, and 
argue (1) that taxes can be and regularly are nonlinear,
3 and (2) that nonlinear 
taxes are second-best optimal; errors in estimating marginal abatement costs do 
not affect the efficiency of well-designed nonlinear taxes. As a result, they argue 
that nonlinear taxes dominate simple permit systems, such as non-traded permits 
or traded permits with hard caps. They also address flexible permit designs, 
                                                 
2 Similar arguments made contemporaneously by Adar and Griffin (1976), Rose-Ackerman 
(1973), and Fishelson (1976). 
3 Ireland (1976) makes a similar argument that contingent tax systems are possible and presents an 
example. 7 
 
focusing on flexibility designs such as those introduced by Roberts and Spence 
(1976). With sufficient design flexibility, they conclude the equivalence between 
taxes and permits is restored, as is argued here.  
Section A briefly reviews Weitzman’s argument, which is likely familiar 
to readers. Section B discusses the assumption of no updating in response to new 
information, arguing that sufficiently rapid updating would not be difficult in the 
climate change context. Section C discusses the assumption of flat-rate taxes and 
fixed quantity limits, arguing that more accurate schedules would not be difficult 
to implement. Section D considers the possibility of combining complex 
schedules and adjustments in response to new information. 
A.  Weitzman’s argument 
Recall that the optimal charge on emissions would be the marginal harm; 
if marginal harm is nonlinear, so is the optimal tax, and if marginal harm changes 
so does the tax. Weitzman makes two assumptions about the government’s 
regulatory options that prevent the government from imposing the optimal charge. 
He assumes first that the government must impose either a fixed, per-unit tax or a 
fixed quantity limitation. The tax, for example, must be fixed at a given amount 
per unit of pollution. The quantity limit must specify the total emissions over time 
or in a given period.
4 Second, Weitzman assumes that the tax rate or quantity 
remains fixed; even if the government gains new information about the optimal 
tax or quantity, the original guess is not changed, at least for some unspecified 
time period.  
Sections B and C below will discuss whether these assumptions are 
reasonable for climate change. To demonstrate Weitzman’s argument, I will 
                                                 
4 Weitzman was considering a pollutant that cause harm in the period emitted – a flow pollutant. 
Carbon dioxide emitted in one period contributes to the stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
and it is stock concentrations that cause harm. Hoel and Karp (2002), Newell and Pizer (2003), 
and Karp and Zhang (2005) discuss how to translate Weitzman’s arguments from flow to stock 
pollutants. These considerations do not change the arguments in the text. 
 
Weitzman was also considering something closer to a command and control regulation 
than a modern, cap and trade system. It appears that the system he was considering involved the 
government imposing quantity restrictions on individual firms. His arguments, however, are now 
commonly applied to cap and trade systems and I will continue this tradition. 8 
 
assume in this section that they are; the government must pick either a fixed, per 
unit tax or a fixed quantity of emissions.  
If using a fixed-rate tax, the government should set the tax rate where it 
estimates the marginal cost of abatement equals the expected marginal harm from 
another unit of pollution. Firms, knowing their own marginal costs of abatement 
and faced with this tax will emit up to the point where the marginal costs of 
abatement equal the tax rate. If the government estimates marginal harm and 
marginal costs correctly, firms will emit the optimal amount. If using permits, the 
government should set the number of permits the same way it sets a tax: where it 
estimates the marginal cost of abatement equals the expected marginal harm from 
another unit of pollution. As discussed above, if set this way, permits will trade at 
the same price as the tax and the result will be the same. 
If the government incorrectly calculates the marginal abatement cost, taxes 
and permits will have different effects. When the government imposes a tax, the 
firm will set emissions so that the marginal cost of reductions equals the tax rate. 
The quantity of emissions will adjust. When the government fixes the quantity, 
polluters will emit that amount and the price will adjust. The deadweight loss 
from the error will be different because of the different ways the error plays out.  
To determine which instrument is preferred, we must compare quantity 
flexibility to price flexibility. If the marginal harm is relatively flat relative to the 
marginal cost of abatement, the costs of getting quantities wrong is low, making 
taxes preferable. Alternatively, if the marginal harm from changing quantities is 
steep relative to the marginal cost, the cost of getting the quantity wrong is very 
high. If an additional unit of pollution causes terrible harm, we may want to 
simply ban the emission of the additional unit rather than impose a tax on it. 
Quantity restrictions would be preferable. Weitzman demonstrates using a 
second-order approximation of the marginal cost and marginal harm curves, and 
develops a simple formula for instrument choice that relies on the relative slopes 
of these curves.  
To remind readers of the analysis, I reproduce below the standard 
diagrams used to illustrate the issue. The x-axis represents abatement, the 
reduction in emissions; as we move to the right, emissions go down. The y-axis is 
dollars. The downward sloping curve is the marginal benefit from abatement (the 9 
 
inverse of marginal harm) and the upward sloping curve is the marginal cost of 
abatement. The (universal) assumption is that the marginal benefit of abatement 
goes down as we increase abatement; going from very high carbon dioxide 
concentrations to modest concentrations may yield huge benefits but going from 
low to very low concentrations may have small benefits. Similarly, marginal costs 
increase. 
 
Given the government’s best guess of the marginal abatement costs and 
marginal benefits of abatement, the optimal tax is equal to t*, and the optimal 
quantity limit is q*. If set correctly, a tax of t* would result in a quantity q* of 
emissions, and permits traded with quantity limit of q* would sell for t*. The two 
systems would be equivalent. 
 Suppose, however, that the actual marginal cost turns out to be higher 
than anticipated. If we use a tax, it will have been set too low. The optimal tax is 
where the actual marginal cost intersects the marginal benefit curve, topt. Polluters 
will emit carbon up to the point where t* intersects their actual marginal cost. At 
this level of emissions, the marginal benefit of additional abatement exceeds the 
marginal cost, creating deadweight losses because of too little abatement. This is 10 
 
represented by the small, lightly-shaded triangle. If we use permits, polluters will 
emit up to the allowed amount, q*. At this amount, the marginal cost of abating 
exceeds the marginal benefit and abatement should be reduced. The losses are 
represented by the large, dark triangle. The instrument that performs better is the 
one with the smaller loss triangle, in this diagram, the tax. 
The relative size of the triangles depends only on the slopes of the 
marginal cost curve and the marginal benefit curve. As the marginal benefit 
curves gets shallower and the marginal cost curve steeper, taxes look better. 
Permits dominate if the relative slopes are reversed. The intuition behind this 
result is that taxes allow quantities to vary while holding price constant while 
permits allow prices to vary while holding quantity constant. The question is 
where is it better to be wrong: the price or the quantity? A shallow marginal 
benefit curve indicates that getting the quantity wrong does not matter very much 
while a steep marginal cost curve indicates that getting the price wrong does 
matter. Similar, if the slopes of the curves were reversed.
5 
The centrality of these arguments can hardly be over-emphasized. They 
form the core of almost every analysis of instrument choice. Influential reports, 
such as the Stern Review adopt the Weitzman analysis wholesale. Stern (2007). 
Almost all of the scholarly literature on instrument choice elaborates on 
Weitzman’s analysis; a Web of Knowledge Citation count lists around 400 
citations to Weitzman’s article, and this is likely substantially incomplete because 
it does not include many books and edited volumes. (Google Scholar lists 1185 
citations as of November 3, 2009.) It is reproduced without criticism in graduate 
economics textbooks. Mas-Colell, Whinston et al. (1995). It is described in 
numerous Handbook chapters on instrument choice. Kolstad and Toman (2005), 
Bovenberg and Goulder (2002), Helfand, Berck et al. (2003). The Congressional 
Budget Office uses it to analyze Congressional proposals and to provide 
information to members considering legislation. Congressional Budget (2008). 
Research reports by think tanks and environmental non-governmental 
                                                 
5 Uncertainty over marginal harm (as opposed to the marginal costs of abatement) does not affect 
instrument choice. While estimates of marginal harm affect the level of taxes or quantities 
imposed, once they are chosen by the government, firms will optimize without regard to marginal 
harm; firms will make decisions based on their costs and the costs imposed by the regulatory 
regime. Therefore, uncertainty over marginal harm does not affect the choice of instruments. 
Kaplow and Shavell (2002) show that when there is uncertainty over marginal harm, the optimal 
schedule equals the expected marginal harm.  11 
 
organizations, reports that are designed to inform and influence policy makers, 
almost always start with this analysis.
6 It is the central analysis of instrument 
choice. 
B.  Responding to new information, asymmetry in information 
 
1.  Weitzman’s Assumption  
Weitzman’s argument is that firms will respond differently to government 
error when faced with taxes or permits. For this to be true, it has to be the case 
that firms have different estimates of marginal abatement costs than the 
government does. Even if wildly erroneous, if firms’ estimates and the 
government’s estimates are the same, the effects of taxes and permits will be the 
same.  
Weitzman makes his assumption of different estimates of the marginal 
abatement costs by firms’ and the government by assuming that the government 
initially makes an informed guess in the face of uncertainty but does not adjust as 
new information is revealed. He imagines a regulator engaging in the process of 
tátonnement, groping toward the optimal tax rate or quantity limit but eventually 
stopping the process and fixing a rate or quantity, at least for some period of time. 
He notes that: 
[i]n an infinitely flexible control environment where the planners can 
continually adjust instruments to reflect current understanding of a fluid 
situation and producers instantaneously respond, the above considerations are 
irrelevant and the choice of control mode should be made to depend on other 
factors. p. 482  
He argues, however, that at some point, the regulator has to stop gathering 
information and actually implement a plan based on current information. 
Therefore, he concludes, the right way to model the issue is as if the regulator has 
set a fixed tax or quantity limit. Laffont (1977) characterizes Weitzman this way: 
“suppose an iterative scheme is used but is stopped after a few iterations when a 
decision has to be taken.” 
                                                 
6 For example, Aldy, Krupnick et al. (2009) 12 
 
A more general version of the assumption is that there is asymmetric 
information about abatement costs. If the regulator does not have the same 
information about abatement costs as the firm, the regulator will set the tax or 
quantity limit in error and the firm, knowing its actual abatement costs, will 
respond differently to this error depending on whether the regulator uses taxes or 
quantity limits.  
Weitzman’s arguments can rely on either assumption: either there is 
asymmetric information about abatement costs or the regulator has good 
information but fails to update. In either case, the price or quantity limit will be 
set in error, and firms will respond differently to the different forms of regulation.  
The assumptions of no updating and asymmetric information are rarely 
defended or even mentioned. Weitzman himself is careful to note that that the 
regulator might subsequently adjust taxes or quantities and that his model only 
applies during the interim period. Newell and Pizer (2003) defend the assumption 
briefly, arguing that, “[a]lthough state-contingent policies could, in principle, be 
designed to maintain this proposition even under conditions of uncertainty, such 
policies would be of little if any practical use.” Sandmo (2000) argues that “in 
most cases of interest, a tax or quota has to be fixed ex ante, with uncertainty 
about the exact nature of costs and benefits.” Most often, the assumption is not 
mentioned. For example, there are at least recent three chapters in the Handbooks 
of Economics that discuss the Weitzman argument in some detail; none mention 
this restriction.
7 The relevant chapter in Mas-Colell, Whinston et al. (1995), a 
standard graduate text in microeconomics, does not mention these assumptions.  
The question, then, is how rapidly and how well each system can adjust to 
new information about the marginal cost of abatement. If the adjustment is 
sufficiently rapid and accurate, the Weitzman-type differences between the 
systems will be small. If the systems are necessarily rigid, the analysis might have 
force (although it might not, as discussed in section C below). This is a question 
of design: how can each instrument be designed to respond to new information, 
and are there differences in their rates of adjustment.  
                                                 
7 Kolstad and Toman (2005), Bovenberg and Goulder (2002), Helfand, Berck et al. (2003). Karp 
and Zhang (2006) is the only paper I have found on learning and instrument choice. [discuss] 13 
 
2.  The extent of asymmetric information in the climate change context 
generally 
Before examining how well taxes and quantities could be adjusted, we should 
first ask what would be needed in the climate context. Weitzman’s model was of a 
single polluter. If the pollutant is from an individual firm or a modest number of 
firms, the assumption that the firm or firms have better information about their 
marginal cost of abatement than the regulator or that the marginal cost of 
abatement might change quickly may be justified. A single, closely-held invention 
by a firm might cause the regulator’s estimate to have a large error. 
Pizer (2002) provides an illustrative example of how the climate change 
literature incorporates assumptions about information. He calculates that taxes 
produce benefits that are five times larger than permits. The calculation is based 
on an assumption that the relevant policy (say, the choice to use a tax and the rate 
it is set at) remains fixed for 250 years (longer than the existence of the United 
States and longer than the entire industrial revolution). In an illustrative 
calculation for 2010, he assumes that the annual standard deviation in marginal 
abatement costs is 16.43 $/ton C.
8 To get a sense of the magnitude of this 
assumption, he estimates that the marginal abatement costs at the optimum is 
$7.50 per ton of carbon. In effect, he assumes that the government’s best guess 
($7.50) is wildly off from the private sector’s information, and notwithstanding 
that, the government’s estimate remains fixed basically forever. Pizer’s estimates 
have been repeated in information papers for Congress. See Congressional Budget 
(2008). 
Assumptions of this sort are not appropriate for climate change. Climate 
change is a global problem, involving thousands (or perhaps millions) of firms 
and billions of individual polluters. Abatement will require massive changes to 
the economy. Because of the massive, public scale of the problem, firms are not 
likely to have a significant information advantage over governments, nor will the 
information about abatement costs change rapidly. Firms, of course, will know 
their individual costs better than the government, but the relevant price is the 
economy-wide marginal cost of abatement and firms will have no systematic 
advantage computing this number. 
                                                 
8 Pizer is using carbon rather than carbon dioxide as his units. Carbon dioxide weights 44/12 of 
carbon, so the equivalent tax on carbon dioxide can be calculated using this ratio. 14 
 
To elaborate, global carbon emissions come from three basic sources: about 
67% are from burning fossil fuels, 14% are from agriculture, and 12% are from 
deforestation.
9 Estimating the marginal cost of reductions involves estimating the 
marginal cost of changing these systems. It will involve estimates of abatement 
technologies that spread across the entire economy, such as the installation 
economy-wide, new energy systems or the widespread use of new agricultural 
methods. Almost all of these abatement methods will be public; the technologies 
will be readily observable. To the extent there are some private technologies – say 
a proprietary, low emissions method of production – no single or even modest set 
of private technologies will change overall estimates of abatement costs very 
much. Firms are unlikely to have an information advantage over regulators in 
estimating overall marginal abatement costs.
10  
Moreover, estimates of the marginal abatement cost are unlikely to change 
very rapidly. The energy, forestry, and agriculture sectors are massive, global 
systems that will be difficult to change. Absent an invention like table-top cold 
fusion, changes to these systems are incremental. Even important inventions are 
likely to have only a modest effect on the marginal cost of abatement. For 
example, a new method of producing solar or wind power, or a new method of 
raising livestock to reduce methane emissions, will have only a modest effect on 
overall marginal cost. Moreover, current estimates of the marginal cost of 
abatement can include expected technological developments. Only surprises 
matter. It would likely take significant time before current estimates are far off 
previous estimates. 
3.  Taxes 
The question is how likely is it that taxes would be set based on estimates of 
the marginal cost of abatement that are systematically different from firms’ 
estimates because of information problems.
11 As noted, the government is 
unlikely in general to have an information disadvantage in estimating marginal 
abatement costs in the climate change context. The question is what type of 
                                                 
9 Herzog (2009) 
10 The government will not know any particular firm’s abatement costs or the best technology to 
use, which is why market-based instruments should be preferred.  
11 The political system may, of course, produce suboptimal regulation, but claims about 
differential political outcomes for taxes and permits are separate from Weitzman-type claims. 15 
 
information would taxes generate to improve the estimates and how often could 
taxes be adjusted to respond to new information. I address each in turn. 
Tax collections provide the government with information about private 
estimates of marginal abatement costs. In a tax system, the regulator would know 
the tax rate and quantity information. From this information, it can infer polluters’ 
current estimate of marginal abatement costs. For example, suppose that the 
government set the tax rate at $50 per unit of carbon dioxide and estimated that at 
this rate, 100 units should be emitted. If it observes 110 or 90, it can infer that it 
misestimated the marginal cost curve and adjust. If emissions are 110, marginal 
cost is higher than it expected and the tax rate should be adjusted downward, and 
vice versa for emissions of 90. That is, the quantity of emissions at a given tax 
rate reveals private information about marginal abatement costs and the 
government can use that information to adjust the rate.  
Tax returns will necessarily provide this information because quantities are 
necessary for computing taxes; taxpaying entities would have to report quantity 
and multiply this by the tax rate to compute their tax. Tax returns could be 
required at relatively short intervals, at least for fossil fuel emissions because 
these taxes can be collected upstream on a small number of, large entities. 
Moreover, the regulator can also observe imports, exports, production, and 
storage of fossil fuels from data already being collected, and infer emissions. The 
U.S. Energy Information Agency, for example, collects this information on a 
weekly basis.
12 Similarly, satellites are being developed that can closely monitor 
forestry changes on short time scales.  
It is apparent that by both observing technological and cost changes to the 
energy, agriculture, and forestry industries directly and by collecting emissions 
information through the tax or other information reporting systems, there would 
                                                 
12 The EIA publishes a weekly petroleum report, which has information on supply, imports, 
exports, total stocks of crude oil and petroleum products. Similarly, there is a Weekly Natural Gas 
Storage Report breaking down storage and production of national gas into the east and west 
regions of the lower 48 states. A separate report (Natural Gas Monthly), gives month-to-month 
import and export data for the entire country. As for coal, there is a Weekly Coal Production 
Report which provides estimates for U.S. coal production by state, weekly and cumulatively for 
the year. Additionally, EIA publishes the Monthly Energy Review, of which Coal has its own 
section, which reports monthly production, consumption and stocks by sector and imports, exports 
cumulatively for the U.S.  16 
 
be little difference in the government’s and polluters’ information about aggregate 
marginal abatement costs. 
Given this information, the question is how often could the government adjust 
tax rates? It is possible to have very rapid adjustments simply through delegation 
to an expert agency with the authority to make these adjustments. Models in 
include U.S. system is the Federal Reserve, the EU Central Bank, or the Bank of 
England, in which the legislature delegated monetary policy decisions to an expert 
agency largely insulated from political interference. These agencies collect 
detailed information and are able to respond rapidly when new information 
dictates. When adjusting interest rates, they are not subject to the normal rule-
making constraints, such as notice and comment, which slow down regulation. 
When new information indicates that there is a dramatic change in circumstances, 
there is essentially no delay in action. There is no a priori reason a carbon tax rate 
could not similarly be delegated. This may be unrealistic – legislatures in a given 
country and time period may be unwilling to delegate tax rates in this manner. But 
given that rate adjustments would not be needed very frequently, lesser 
delegations or other methods of adjusting rates, would suffice.  
4.  Quantities 
The analysis is similar for quantity restrictions. The government would still 
observe overall changes to the energy, agriculture, and forestry markets, and 
would likely have as good information as polluters about the overall marginal 
costs of abatement. Moreover, the permit system itself would generate 
information because permits are traded. The government, knowing the total 
quantity limitation, would only have to observe price, and it would know this by 
the second simply by observing the market.  
It could also use this information to update the quantity limit. Like with taxes, 
we can imagine delegation to an expert agency like the Federal Reserve which 
could act rapidly to changes in information. Given the relatively slow pace of 
changes in the marginal cost of abatement, lesser delegations and slower changes 
in quantity limits would also suffice. 
5.  Conclusion 17 
 
Weitzman’s argument relies on an assumption of asymmetric information, 
either because the government does not have as good information as polluters 
about marginal abatement costs or because it has the information but fails to 
update the regulatory system because of some bureaucratic flaw. This assumption 
is untenable in the climate context. If the government has good information about 
the marginal cost of abatement and can update whenever that information is 
significantly out of date, there are no differences between taxes and permits.
13 
C.  Complex schedules 
 
1.  Assumption of simple schedules 
The second necessary assumption in Weitzman’s argument is that the tax is a 
flat rate tax – $x per unit of pollution – and that the quantity restriction is a 
simple, fixed quantity. As noted, the optimal system would impose a charge equal 
to the marginal harm from emissions, which is not likely to match either of these 
schedules. Weitzman defends this assumption by arguing that it should be 
“apparent that it is infeasible” to use more complex schedules and that analyzing 
these systems “is the best way to focus sharply and directly on the essential 
differences between prices and quantities as planning instruments.” p. 481. As 
noted above, Newell and Pizer (2003) argue that state-contingent schedules are 
infeasible.
14 
If the government imposes a charge equal to the marginal harm from 
emissions, it would not have to know marginal abatement costs. Whatever the 
private estimates of marginal abatement costs, the charge would be correct. 
Therefore, there would be no Weitzman-type differential error costs from taxes 
and permits. To illustrate, imagine that the government was unsure whether 
marginal abatement costs was either high or low. If it imposes a schedule equal to 
estimated marginal harm, firms will face the correct charge regardless.
15 
                                                 
13 [Comment about size of adjustments/learning assumed in Karp and Zhang (2006)] 
 
14 This could refer either to complex schedules or to simple schedules that are adjusted to new 
information. Pizer (2002) recommends a system with a complex schedule but assumes that 
policies stay in place for 250 years without adjusting to new information, implying that the quote 
refers to adjusting to new information. 
15 Figure 1 in Kaplow and Shavell (2002) illustrates. 18 
 
Asymmetric information about the marginal abatement cost or failure to update 
would, as a result, be irrelevant, and Weitzman’s argument would not hold. 
2.  How complicated would the schedule have to be? 
An initial question in determining whether the government could impose a 
charge equal to the marginal harm from emission is how complex would such a 
schedule be? It is likely extremely simple and relatively flat; the marginal harm of 
climate change is thought to change slowly with emissions 
Marginal harm will increase over a broad range of concentrations – the harm 
from an increment of emissions will likely be higher at 750 parts per million than 
at 400. But these are changes in marginal harm over an enormous difference in 
concentrations. Even at current emissions rates, changes of this magnitude would 
take more than a century. Within any region, the changes are likely minimal. The 
difference in harm from an increment of emissions at 350, 450, and 550 is likely 
small enough to be difficult to measure. If the government merely estimated 
marginal harm over this range of concentrations, sufficient to cover decades of 
emissions, the marginal harm curve would likely be relatively simple (not simple 
to estimate, but simple in its shape). 
To illustrate, right now, carbon dioxide is increasing at about two parts per 
million per year. A schedule that used a different marginal harm estimate for each 
one part per million change in concentrations would only mean a tax rate or 
quantity limitation that changes every six months. It is doubtful that there are 
measurable differences in marginal harm at this level of detail. If we could only 
measure changes in marginal harm for differences of, say, around 10 parts per 
million, a new tax rate or quantity would only have to apply once every five 
years. Tax rate schedules or quantity restrictions that mimic the marginal harm 
curve could be extremely simple. 
One question is whether the possibility of a tipping point changes this 
conclusion. Environmental outcomes might be non-linear, so that we see very 
little change until carbon concentrations hit some level, at which point we see 
dramatic and fast changes. For example, as sea-ice melts, it exposes a darker 
ocean surface which absorbs more heat, amplifying the warming. If this effect is 
strong enough, sea-ice melting might be self-sustaining once it gets past a given 
point. Scientists looking at climate history going back millions of years see 19 
 
evidence for very fast changes, creating real concern about the possibility of a 
tipping point. Lenton (2008). If there is a tipping point, it would be very important 
to keep concentrations below that level. 
The possibility of a tipping point does not change the conclusion that the 
expected marginal harm curve would likely look relatively smooth.
 16 The optimal 
charge is equal to the expected marginal harm. We have little information about 
where such a tipping point might be or how steeply damages would increase at a 
tipping point. When we average over uncertain schedules, even if some of them 
have sharp kinks, the expected schedule will still be smooth. 
To illustrate, suppose that the likelihood of a kink in the marginal harm curve 
at 550 ppm, 600 ppm, 650 ppm, and so forth, was some estimated percent, say 1% 
or 2%, (which if one thinks about the damages from surpassing a tipping point, is 
a large number). To determine expected marginal harm, we take the probability-
weighted average over all possible marginal harm curves. At each level of 
concentration, there is only a small chance of a kink, and the expectation will be 
relatively flat. The overall expectation will be higher because of the possibility of 
tipping point, (because marginal harm is higher if there are tipping points), but the 
expectation will still rise smoothly. The possibility of tipping points would not 
make the schedule substantially more complex. 
3.  Taxes 
It is clear that a tax schedule could be sufficiently complex to mimic the 
marginal harm curve. The schedule would only need to list a set of concentrations 
(or possibly flows of emissions) and the corresponding tax rate. Data on flows and 
concentrations are computed at least annually under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Polluters could simply look up the 
tax rate applicable to the current concentration or flow of carbon dioxide and 
apply it. If rates change over time – for example, in some proposals they go up 
with the interest rate even absent changes in concentrations – taxpayers would 
also have to know the date.  
This is vastly simpler than type of schedule currently in use for income taxes 
around the world. Section 1 of the U.S Internal Revenue Code includes multiple 
                                                 
16 Louis Kaplow pointed out this argument to me. 20 
 
nonlinear rate schedules. There are phase-outs, limitations, and different rates that 
apply to specific items. There are uncertainties and judgment calls on how to 
report many items. Tax rates also change over time; as was done in the recent 
Bush tax cuts, Congress may apply one set of rates to one year and other to 
another year and do so differently for different items of income and different 
types of deductions. Other countries have similarly complex schedules.  
In addition, income tax schedules apply to individuals. A carbon tax could be 
imposed at the firm level.
17 Firms would have a much easier time dealing with 
complex schedules than individuals. It is hard to think of a defense of the 
argument that carbon tax rates could not be sufficiently complex to mimic 
expected marginal harm. 
4.  Quantities 
It might be slightly more difficult for a quantity schedule to mimic the 
marginal harm curve because a simple, fixed quantity limit would not be as close 
to marginal harm as would simple, fixed-rate taxes; because the marginal harm 
from emissions is relatively flat, even the simplest tax schedule would be close to 
marginal harm. Nevertheless, it is apparent that it is feasible.  
One widely discussed possibility is a set of price ceilings and floors: if the 
traded permit price in a quantity regime exceeds a limit, new permits could be 
issued automatically, creating a price ceiling. Similarly, if permit prices drop 
below a floor, the government could repurchase permits.
18 
To illustrate, consider Figure x. In Figure x, the government imposes a 
quantity restriction where the estimated marginal harm from emissions equals the 
estimated marginal cost – the vertical line at q*. The government, however, also 
includes a price ceiling and floor. If the price goes above a set amount, the 
government will issue new permits at that price, effectively converting the system 
into a tax at the ceiling price. Similarly, if the price goes down below a set 
amount, the government will repurchase permits, ensuring that they do not go 
below that price. The heavy black line illustrates the net effect. As can be seen, 
the heavy black line closely matches the marginal benefit curve.  
                                                 
17 Metcalf and Weisbach (2009). 
18 For a discussion of this system, see Jacoby and Ellerman (2004).  21 
 
 
A related alternative, proposed by Roberts and Spence (1976) is having the 
regulator issuing permits with different exercise prices; permits at a given 
exercise price would allow holders to pay the exercise price for the right to emit a 
set amount. Once all of the permits at a given exercise price are used up, holders 
would have to use permits with higher exercise prices, and so forth, thereby 
creating a price schedule that mimics (as closely as desired), the marginal harm 
schedule. The system could have as many steps as is desirable.  
Newell, Pizer et al. (2005) consider the possibility of a banking system where 
the number of permits issued in each period varies based on information learned 
in the prior period. They show that this system has the same cost flexibility as a 
price-based system. Depending on the degree of flexibility desired, various limits 
could be placed on the regulator, such as a limit on the number of permits it could 
sell. Pizer (2002), Murray, Newell et al. (2009) consider yet additional 
mechanisms. 
5.  Conclusion 
It is clear that both taxes and permits can be structured to mimic the marginal 
harm curve. For taxes, we need merely to publish a schedule of rates. For permits, 22 
 
we need a slightly more elaborate mechanism in which additional permits are 
bought or sold over time. If the regulatory regime mimics the marginal harm 
curve, Weitzman’s argument about asymmetric information in the marginal cost 
curve does not apply. 
6.  Combining complex schedules and adjustments 
The two sections above argued that either (i) rate or quantity adjustments 
while maintaining Weitzman’s assumption of flat rate taxes and simple quantity 
limits or (ii) more complex (yet still relatively simple) schedules would alone be 
sufficient to make Weitzman’s arguments irrelevant in the climate context. The 
argument, however, is even stronger because complex schedules and adjustments 
to new information can be combined.  
All that matters is that the price faced by polluters equals the best estimate of 
marginal harm. We can achieve this by dialing in how complex a schedule we 
want and how often we want to adjust the schedule in response to new 
information about the marginal abatement cost curve. A schedule that perfectly 
mimics marginal harm would eliminate the differences between taxes and 
permits.
19 A schedule that was adjusted to include all new information about the 
marginal abatement cost curve would also eliminate the differences. If there are 
concerns about schedule complexity or frequency of adjustments, systems could 
combine the two. A schedule of intermediate complexity would need less frequent 
adjustments than a simple schedule because it would already be closer to marginal 
harm; when marginal costs of abatement change, the intermediately complex 
schedule would have some built-in adjustments. Only when these built-in 
adjustments are not sufficient would the entire schedule have to be changed.  
In the climate change context, it is likely that optimal schedules would be 
relatively simple and would need to be adjusted relatively infrequently. 
Nevertheless, we could have schedules that are as complex as need be and that 
adjust as frequently as need be. As noted, if a different tax or quantity limit were 
imposed for every single additional part per million of carbon dioxide 
concentrations, we would only need a new tax rate or quantity limit twice per 
year. Adjustments to the schedule, if necessary, could happen instantaneously as 
                                                 
19 It would, of course, have to be adjusted as we learn new information about marginal harm, but 
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new information is revealed or on a regular basis, such as once every year or 
every five years. It is hard to imagine that between nonlinear price schedules and 
adjustments to those schedules that we cannot impose a price that is close to 
expected marginal harm. 
7.  Summary: the artificial distinction between prices and quantities and 
modeling strategies 
Weitzman’s arguments rely on two assumptions that are untenable in the 
climate change context: flat rate tax rates or fixed quantity limitations and no 
adjustment as new information about the optimal schedule is revealed. In the 
climate change context, it would be any more difficult than fixed-rate taxes and 
they could be adjusted at relevant intervals. Variable quantity limits, adjust them 
over time, could also be used. Weitzman’s analysis, therefore, has little or no 
relevance to the choice of instruments for climate change.  
Once we consider complex schedules and rate adjustments in response to new 
information, the difference between taxes and permits begins to dissolve. The 
goal of market-based climate policy is to force polluters to consider the harm they 
impose on others. They need to face a set of charges equal to the marginal harm 
they cause. Flat rate taxes and fixed quantity limits are just two possible schedules 
of prices that a regulator can use, and neither is likely to be optimal unless 
marginal harm happens to take a particular shape. Complex schedules fall 
between these extremes. A better debate to have than which simple instrument is 
better is how to best construct a more accurate instrument.  
Recent proposals implicitly make this point. Indeed, they almost seemed 
designed to make fun of the artificial distinction between taxes and permits. One 
example is the “managed price allowance’ approach to permits. Under this 
approach, put forth most prominently by the Congressional Budget Office, 
polluters would be required to purchase a permit, just like in an ordinary quantity 
restriction regime.
20 But permits would be purchased directly from the 
government at a preset price and without a restriction in the amount that can be 
sold. It is simply a tax disguised as a permit system. Under another proposal put 
forth by Gilbert Metcalf, the government would impose a tax in which the rate 
                                                 
20U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2009). 24 
 
would automatically adjust to meet a quantity target.
21 If in a given period, 
emissions are too high, the rate would go up in the next period and stay there until 
emissions are back on the preplanned path. This is a quantity restriction disguised 
as a tax (and with some features that often go along with taxes, such as no strict 
per-period emissions limit and flexibility across periods). It is also exactly the sort 
of state-contingent system that Weitzman (1974) and Newell and Pizer (2003) 
rule out as infeasible. Once we consider proposals of this sort, it should be clear 
that the simple end-points are meaningless. 
It is clear that these sorts of complex schedules are feasible. In the climate 
change context, cap and trade proposals with price caps and floors are regularly 
discussed. Price ceilings have been included in numerous bills. At a minimum, 
given recent proposals, it is no longer possible to argue that only simple systems 
are realistic; the Waxman Markey bill is 1,200 pages long and is unbelievably 
complex.  
Sometimes it is useful to examine endpoints as it helps inform us about the 
middle; models with extreme assumptions are often useful to illustrate the 
underlying structure. In this case, however, it is not clear how much, if anything, 
we learn by examining flat rate taxes or fixed quantity permits that remain fixed 
for centuries when both are dominated by feasible intermediate regimes. Doing so 
frames the debate in a way that causes commentators to focus on the wrong 
issues, such as which of the extreme systems is preferable rather than how to 
design a system that best causes polluters to internalize marginal harm. 
III.  Seven potential differences: 
There are a large number of other potential differences between taxes and 
permits that have been mentioned in the literature. Below are brief discussions of 
seven such potential differences. 
A.  Revenue/distribution/transition 
One claimed difference between taxes and permits is that they might raise 
different amounts of revenue and consequently have different distributive effects 
and secondary effects on the income tax system. The reason is permits tend to be 
given away which means that they would not raise any revenue, unlike a tax.  
                                                 
21 Metcalf (2009). 25 
 
Taxes and permits are, however, the same in this regard. Auctioned permits 
would raise the same revenue as a tax imposed at the auction price. Similarly, a 
tax system with grandfathering for existing emissions or offering refundable tax 
credits to the same individuals or firms that would have received free permits 
would have the same revenue and distributional effects as freely allocated 
permits.
22 
The basis of the claim that they are different is that as an historical matter, 
environmental permits, with minor exceptions, have always been given away 
while new taxes sometimes have grandfathering but often do not. The claim that 
permits have always been given away is based on a list of environmental cap and 
trade systems, such as the U.S. sulfur dioxide system and the EU carbon dioxide 
system. If we look at cases where the government has created new property rights 
more broadly, however, there are examples of auctioning. The most significant 
example is the auctioning of electromagnetic spectrum rights in both the U.S. and 
the EU, in each case raising tens of billions of dollars. There are numerous other 
examples of government allocation of new property rights, such as the allocation 
of public lands or mineral leases and the distribution of newly public firms in the 
transition away from communism. Often these property rights are given away but 
not always. It is not clear that we can draw general lessons that apply across 
nations, time periods, and programs. 
Suppose it is irresistible for the government to give away permits; the 
opportunity to pay off favored industries is simply too great. If this is the case, 
however, taxes will also likely be given way through grandfathering and the like. 
That is, the basic problem of building a coalition to pass a carbon pricing regime 
does not change with the label. If an adversely affected industry can block a bill, 
they will have to be paid off regardless of which system is enacted. Both taxes 
and permits offer equal opportunities for graft. 
If, notwithstanding these considerations, the two systems are different – say, 
in a given country and time period, permits likely to be given away, taxes not – 
we have to ask which approach is better, requiring polluters to pay for the initial 
rights to pollute through a non-grandfathered tax or given them the right for free 
through a permit allocation. A complete discussion of this issue would take us 
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afield, but most commentators argue that it is better to collect the revenue – 
impose a tax or auction permits. The reasons vary, but the most important is that 
grandfathering existing emissions creates bad incentive effects; the more you 
polluted in the past, the more valuable emissions permits you will receive. The 
argument is similar to the arguments made about legal transitions in other 
contexts.
23 The result is a preference for taxes.  
At a minimum, commentators should be clear about their rankings. Rather 
than basing rankings on the assumption that permits will be given away and taxes 
will not be grandfathered – and relying on the reader to have these same 
assumptions – commentators should distinguish four (or more) systems: auctioned 
permits, taxes, freely allocated permits, and grandfathered taxes (plus 
combinations, such as 50% auctioned permits). The ranking of these four systems 
will look different than a ranking of just pure flat rate taxes and fixed quantity 
restrictions with an implicit assumption about grandfathering. 
B.  Complexity 
An argument against cap and trade systems is that they are more complex to 
administer than a tax. There are three possible reasons. The first is that a cap and 
trade system needs a market, and markets may be costly to operate. Even in deep 
and liquid markets, trading costs can add up. A tax system does not need such a 
market; the regulator simply collects the tax. Note that in both systems, the 
regulator needs to monitor the quantity of emissions, so monitoring and 
enforcement costs should be similar. The difference is the costs of creating and 
operating the market.  
A second difference is that cap and trade systems tend to have time-stamped 
permits. Time-stamped permits are permits that can be used only in a specified 
time period. Time-stamped permits are the default assumption when 
commentators discuss permits. This is likely because for pollutants where the 
flow matters, time-stamped permits are necessary; the regulatory system must 
control emissions in each period because it is emissions per period that cause 
harm. In the case of a stock pollutant like carbon dioxide, flows do not matter, and 
we, therefore, need additional reasons to use time-stamped permits 
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One possible reason for using time-stamped permits is that periodic 
allocations allow the regulator to better control the number of permits issued (and 
thereby respond to new information). If the regulator is uncertain about the 
optimal number of permits to issue, it might be best to issue only a limited 
number in each period so that adjustments can be made more easily. Another 
reason might be that the government might want to prevent firms from unduly 
accelerating permit use if the government cannot credibly commit not to issue 
new permits in the future.
24  
If permits are issued only for fixed periods, however, then the economy loses 
the flexibility to determine when to reduce emissions.
25 Cap and trade systems 
would potentially create inefficiencies in the allocation of abatement efforts 
across time. The problem then becomes one of minimizing this inefficiency while 
not subjecting the government to whatever problems caused it to issue limited-
time permits in the first place.  
Mechanisms that do this – so-called banking and borrowing provisions – add 
complexity. Banking systems allow firms to use permits issued for one period in 
future periods. These are relatively uncontroversial and not very complex to 
administer. Borrowing systems allow firms to borrow permits from the future to 
use today. This is more difficult to administer because it requires commitments to 
future actions by the firms, the government, or both. For example, if permits are 
freely allocated and firms could borrow, they could simply borrow permits from 
the future and then hope the government reneges in the future and issues 
additional permits. If firms depleted future years’ permit supplies, the government 
would face significant pressure to issue more permits to prevent severe 
dislocations. Mechanisms to control borrowing, therefore, tend to be complex and 
limited. 
The third difference is that cap and trade systems may need a larger number of 
caps, floors, adjustments, and the like than a tax system would. A simple, flat rate 
                                                 
24 A third reason might be that periodic allocations provide more opportunities for rent extraction 
by legislators. With a single permanent allocation, however, the stakes are larger. It is not clear 
whether legislators would be better off with a single, massive allocation or periodic smaller 
allocations. If legislators have limited terms in office, they would likely prefer giving away all of 
the permits relatively quickly. See Fischel and Sykes (1999). 
25 Individual firms could still purchase permits to pollute today in exchange for permits in the 
future, but in the aggregate, emissions would be fixed in each period. 28 
 
tax might be closely to the marginal harm curve than a simple fixed quantity 
restriction, so it would need less jury-rigging to improve its accuracy. Caps, 
floors, and similar adjustment mechanisms add complexity and costs. 
While these arguments demonstrate that a cap and trade system is likely to 
have some additional costs, it is not clear how much. The costs of operating 
markets, having price ceilings and floors, and having banking and borrowing 
provisions, may be high but we do not yet have sufficient evidence to know.  
C.  Information generation 
A possible advantage of a cap and trade system is that the market for permits 
generates information. In particular, the set of future prices for permits is 
information about market participants’ views of abatement costs in the future. To 
consider an extreme example to illustrate the point, imagine that industry but not 
the government knows that, five years from now, we will have a low carbon 
technology that will make it free to eliminate emissions (that is, the price of 
carbon-free energy will be below the price of fossil fuels). In a cap and trade 
system, industry would borrow permits from the future to use now. The 
government, not knowing about the technology, would observe low permit prices 
and high permit usage now. It would also observe low futures prices. The 
government could draw inferences from this information and could use it to set 
policy; it would be able to infer that industry expects abatement to be cheap in the 
future. 
With taxes, the government would have a harder time making similar 
observations. Industry would anticipate very low taxes in the future but the 
government would not get any signal indicating this expectation. It would likely 
see little abatement now but would not know that this is because of anticipated 
changes to abatement costs. Instead, it might be because abatement is more costly 
than expected. The government could observe forward prices in fossil fuels, 
however, which will give some indication of expected marginal costs. To the 
extent that permit markets convey better information than commodity markets, 
permit systems might convey some information to the government that taxes do 
not. 
If the government issues time-stamped permits (and banking and borrowing 
are limited), however, this advantage for permits would disappear. The key 29 
 
informational advantage of permits in the above example was that by giving 
polluters price and quantity flexibility across years, the government could infer 
information about expectations for future years. If firms no longer have flexibility 
across years – and they would not in a time-stamped permit system – the 
government can no longer make these inferences. It would have no better 
information that it would get from a tax system. 
The information available from the market, moreover, reflects the market’s 
view of future government policy as well as abatement costs; the market in the 
example above might think that the government is going to issue more permits in 
the future. The government, therefore, would have a hard time getting clean 
interpretations from market data. The only way it could get clean information 
would be to not act on the information it learns.  
Finally, if the information generated by a futures market is truly valuable in 
setting policy, we can set up an information market within a tax system. The 
market, for example, could allow participants to place bets on emissions at given 
dates. 
D.  Price volatility 
One common concern with quantity restrictions is volatility in the price of 
traded permits. The history of existing cap and trade systems demonstrates that 
they tend to have significant price volatility. Nordhaus (2007), for example, 
computes the price volatility of the U.S. cap and trade system for sulfur dioxide, 
showing that it has volatility very close to that of oil and substantially greater than 
the S&P 500. The concern is that this sort of volatility will hurt investment, 
reducing the benefit of imposing a carbon price. In addition, Baldursson and von 
der Fehr (2004) argue that if permit holders are risk averse, that volatility will 
reduce trading and might result in inefficient patterns of permit ownership.  
To evaluate concerns about volatility, we need to ask why it arises. A central 
reason permit prices may change is new information about marginal abatement 
costs. If, for example, new information shows that abatement will be less 
expensive than thought, permit prices will go down, and vice versa if abatement 
will be more expensive. Price changes in response to new information should be 
encouraged. Markets are a method of aggregating information held by dispersed 
parties. They are one of the central advantages of a market system as opposed to 30 
 
centralized planning. Indeed, Section C above listed the information gained from 
the permits market as a benefit of permits. The last thing we should want to do is 
to suppress these sorts of price changes.  
An analogy is to commodity markets. The earth has scarce resources of 
various minerals, fossil fuels, and atmosphere. Markets for these commodities 
serve as a method of conveying information about their relative scarcity, the price 
of substitutes and so forth. In fact, the same holds true for markets in almost any 
product. As a general matter, we do not want to suppress price changes. 
A second reason for volatility might be what we might call noise trading 
effects. A long standing concern in the stock market, stemming from Shiller 
(1981), is that stock prices might be excessively volatile. Following Shiller, a 
number of papers, including Delong, Shleifer et al. (1990) developed models of 
stock trading by irrational “noise traders” that lead to excess volatility. It is 
possible that permit markets would exhibit similar effects. After more than 30 
years of study, however, we do not know whether, and the extent to which, stock 
markets are excessively volatile. Researchers disagree. Shiller (2003), Malkiel 
(2003). Similarly, simply showing that permit markets have been volatile does not 
show that they are excessively volatile. 
If permit markets are excessively volatile due to noise trading and similar 
effects, it is not clear what can be done that does not also suppress price changes 
that convey information. The problem is quite general – it applies to all markets 
that exhibit excessive volatility – and there are no widely accepted solutions. 
Stock markets take some measures to reduce volatility, such as circuit breaker 
rules, short sale restrictions, and the like. These measures are all controversial 
because they inhibit price discovery and may do little to address the underlying 
problems of excess volatility. To the extent measures of this sort work, they might 
be incorporated into permit markets. 
A final reason for permit market volatility is bad market design. In the climate 
context, even if we think we know optimal maximum concentration of carbon 
dioxide, nobody claims to know the year by year optimal flows. Time-stamped 
permits, however, impose year by year limits. Year-by-year limits, by preventing 
trading across periods, can create excess supply or too little supply of permits in a 
given period. Going back to the analogy of a commodity market, extraction of 31 
 
commodities can be accelerated or commodities can be stored. Time-stamped 
permit markets would not be like most commodity markets in this regard. They 
would look more like the market for raspberries – no storage and no ability to 
accelerate production once planting is done. The solution to this sort of volatility 
is good market design. If time stamping is the source of volatility, it will be 
desirable to reduce time stamping either by not doing it at all or by allowing 
banking/borrowing.  
What about the claim that volatility will reduce investment or alter trading 
patterns? It is not clear why the effects of volatility in permits markets would be 
different than volatility in other markets. Individuals deal with volatility through 
diversification. Although firms, as a result, should be risk neutral, risk may affect 
firm behavior in adverse ways. For example, it may make it harder for owners to 
monitor managers, managers may be risk averse because they have overly 
concentrated exposure to the firm, and so forth. Firms can diversify to some 
extent to reduce this risk and can also use hedging techniques to transfer the risk 
to market participants who can diversify or otherwise bear the risk cheaply.  
Note in addition, that firms will not suboptimally delay investment because of 
price volatility that is a result of changes to estimates of marginal costs.
26 So long 
as the trading price is a good estimate of marginal cost, firms will invest 
optimally, making decisions to delay or accelerate investment just like they do in 
general. Other than volatility caused by bad permit market design, it is hard to see 
why volatility is a particular problem of permit markets. 
Finally, note that in a tax system, firms must still face the problem of newly 
arriving information about marginal abatement costs. If the estimated marginal 
abatement cost shifts around constantly due to new studies and the like, firms will 
have to make investment decisions in the face of the uncertainty. Tax systems do 
not face the problem of market design or noise traders, but they do face the same 
problem of underlying uncertainty about abatement costs.  
E.  Framing 
There are a number of potential differences between taxes and permits that fall 
under the rubric of perceptions or framing. Claims about these differences are 
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invariably made casually, so it is difficult to evaluate them. Consider the 
following three. 
One commonly made claim with respect to the choice of instruments in the 
United States is that the United States Congress will not pass anything called a tax 
on emissions or energy. Many commentators making this claim say that this is 
one of the primary reasons they prefer a cap and trade system. Stavins (2008), 
Keohane (2009). But this is not a rationale for a cap and trade system. This is 
simply a statement that if a tax cannot be enacted, a cap and trade is next best. 
That the United States Congress will not do something is not an argument that it 
is not preferred; it is unrelated to the merits. Moreover, it is difficult to predict 
outcomes of legislative negotiations. To the extent the views of these analysts 
matter, they hurt the chances of a tax being enacted when they support a cap and 
trade system for political rather than fundamental reasons; if all analysts had a 
true rank ordering of taxes over permits and if they gave their true rank ordering 
rather than modifying it to predict what the legislature will do, legislative 
outcomes might be different. 
An example might be the history of permits. When economists first suggested 
the idea of tradable permits, the idea was not widely accepted. Environmentalists 
opposed the idea because it allowed people to pay for the right to behave badly. 
People called it “morally bankrupt” or “a license to kill.”
27 Over time, however, as 
analysts continued to argue the merits of the system, the ideas became acceptable 
and eventually, some environmental groups accepted it. The U.S. Congress used 
the system in a major amendment to the Clean Air Act in 1990 and eventually the 
Europeans accepted the idea for carbon dioxide. It was only because analysts 
ignored the conventional wisdom that cap and trade systems were politically 
unacceptable that we can tell this history. We cannot know whether there will be a 
similar evolution for environmental taxes, but analysts can only help by making 
arguments on the merits rather than guesses about political acceptability. 
A second claim, discussed above, is that the legislature is more likely to give 
away permits than to grandfather existing emissions in a tax. Somehow, the 
framing of forcing firms to purchase the right to do something they have always 
done in the past is different than imposing a tax on them for doing it. It is true that 
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legislators in the U.S. and around the world have often given away permits, 
although, as mentioned, there are examples of very large auctions. It is, however, 
just as easy to grandfather existing emissions under a tax by offering “tax relief” 
to aggrieved taxpayers. If the politics require buying off powerful interests to pass 
a bill, it is hard to see how those interests go away when the framing is changed 
and even harder to see how commentators considering the economics of 
instrument choice are well positioned to predict political outcomes. Moreover, as 
noted, if it is true that permits will be given away and taxes will not be 
grandfathered, commentators should simply be clear about their ranking of the 
systems with all of their assumed attributed, as suggested above.  
Finally, it may be more likely that we end up with a fixed quantity limit when 
we use permits than when we use taxes simply because of the language of permits 
as fixing quantities. Cap and trade systems tend to start with hard limits and then 
people debate about whether to have a price ceiling and floor. In the current U.S. 
debate, the price ceiling is referred to as a safety valve and is viewed as a 
deviation from the basic system rather than an inherent feature that makes the 
prices faced by polluters better reflect the marginal harm. Taxes tend to start with 
systems with variable quantities and then there is a debate about how to limit 
quantities if emissions do not decline fast enough. Perhaps starting at each end, 
the two meet in the middle at the optimal system, but it is not clear that this would 
happen. The framing might matter.  
F.  Environmental certainty, tipping points 
The most commonly made argument that a quantity limit is preferable to a tax 
in the climate context is that a quantity limit provides certainty; it avoids the 
possibility of catastrophic outcomes. Section II.B. argued that such a possibility 
should have no effect on the choice of instrument, although it will increase the 
stringency of the system, whichever one is chosen. The basic idea was that even if 
some possible marginal harm schedules have tipping points, and tipping points 
might happen at various concentrations, the expected marginal harm will be 
higher than without this possibility but also smoothly increasing. A marginal 
increase in concentration at any given point will increase the probability of hitting 
the tipping point only by a small amount, so expected marginal harm increases 
only by a small amount. The optimal environmental charge would reflect this 34 
 
smoothly increasing schedule.
28 Both taxes and permits perform equally well in 
this context. 
A related (perhaps the same) claim is that because taxes allow people to 
pollute as much as they want by paying the tax, taxes do not provide the necessary 
environmental certainty – they run the risk of carbon concentrations that are 
dangerously high. Only a fixed cap on emissions ensures that we keep 
concentrations at a safe level. As two well-known climate analysts put it, “a cap-
and-trade system, coupled with adequate enforcement, assures that environmental 
goals actually would be achieved by a certain date. Given the potential for 
escalating damages and the urgent need to meet specific emission targets, such 
certainty is a major advantage.”
29  
The environmental certainty claim has a number of problems. Suppose that 
there was a hard cap on global emissions with strong enforcement measures to 
ensure compliance so that we knew that carbon concentrations would be limited 
to a chosen amount. This would create emissions certainty but would not create 
environmental certainty. The reason is that we have very little understanding of 
the environmental outcomes for any given level of carbon concentration. The 
IPCC, for example, puts climate sensitivity (the equilibrium global average 
temperature increase for a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations) between 2º 
and 4.5º Celsius, a range wide enough to include modest but manageable harms to 
severe disruption. That is, even if we knew for certain that carbon dioxide 
concentrations would at most double, we would have very little idea of the 
environmental outcome.  
Moreover, modest changes in carbon dioxide concentrations do not 
substantially change our expectations for the environment. The International 
Energy Agency compared a hard emissions cap to policies that allowed some 
                                                 
28 The argument in the text is that Weitzman-type considerations do not apply in the climate 
context because, even with tipping points, there is sufficient design flexibility to make taxes and 
permits equivalent. Even if one were to adopt a Weitzman-type analysis, the result is similar. Pizer 
(2003) used a model based on Weitzman’s analysis to analyzing the problem of tipping points. He 
concluded that if we were near a tipping point, the differences between the two instruments are 
swamped by the shear necessity of putting in place a stringent regime quickly. That is, if we were 
near a tipping point, it wouldn’t matter so much how we reduced emission as it would matter that 
we did so quickly. Moreover, there may be substantial harms from setting policy based on 
incorrect guesses about a tipping point. 
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flexibility. Philibert (2008). The hard cap cut emissions in half by 2050; the 
flexible policy had the same goal but put a ceiling and floor on permit prices, so 
that if, say, permit traded above some amount, polluters could purchase additional 
permits at that price, effectively converting the cap into a tax. In their model, the 
hard cap fixed concentrations at 462 parts per million (ppm) while the flexible 
policy produced a range of outcomes between 432 ppm and 506 ppm.
30 The 
environmental outcomes in the two cases were essentially identical: the median 
temperature increase was 2.49 for the hard cap and 2.53 for the flexible policy; 
the risk of avoiding a very bad outcome (5º C increase in global average surface 
temperatures) was 98.5% for the hard cap and 98.3% for the flexible policy. But 
the flexible policy cost less than 1/3 of the hard cap. It concluded, “achieving a 
given concentration level (such as 462 ppm ) exactly or on average does not make 
any real difference to the environmental outcome. The uncertainty introduced by 
price caps in concentration levels is entirely masked behind the uncertainty on 
climate sensitivity.” 
The second problem with the environmental certainty claim is that it makes 
unrealistic assumptions about how taxes and permits would work. It assumes 
compliance with cap that remains fixed over time regardless of cost, and it 
assumes no adjustment to the tax rate if emissions exceed expectations. Once we 
relax the assumption of a compliance with cap that does not change, we lose the 
any benefit of certainty that a cap might offer. For example, if costs under a 
stringent cap turn out to be very high and we therefore loosen the cap, we no 
longer have certainty over final concentrations. Similarly, once we relax the 
assumption of a tax that is not adjusted to take its effect on behavior into account, 
taxes are able to achieve more certain carbon concentrations. Thus, if a given 
level of tax does not produce the predicted emissions reductions, we can increase 
the tax rate. Realistically, both caps and taxes will (and should) be adjusted over 
time as we learn more about climate science and the costs of reducing emissions.  
G.  Institutions 
A final difference between quantity restrictions and taxes is that they may rely 
on different administrative apparatus and go through different legislative 
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revolution concentrations were around 280 ppm and current concentrations are around 380. 
Commonly discussed goals tend to be around 450 ppm. 36 
 
processes. In the United States, a tax is likely to be administered by the Internal 
Revenue Service, and the congressional committees with primary jurisdiction are 
the tax-writing committees. A quantity limit is likely to be administered by the 
Environmental Protection Agency or perhaps the Energy Department and the 
committees with primary jurisdiction are likely committees with responsibility for 
energy and the environment. These differences will change the results. It might, 
for example, be much simpler to have the Internal Revenue Service administer the 
program because of its regular contact with taxpayers and its experience in 
measuring quantities. Or it might be better to have the Environmental Protection 
Agency administer the program because of its expertise in climate matters or the 
Energy Department because of its expertise on fossil fuels and alternative energy. 
Other countries may have different considerations. 
This means is that individual nations might prefer one system or another 
because of local contingencies, such as a particularly competent agency, expert 
legislative committee, and so forth. It says nothing in general about the choice of 
instruments. Indeed, even with local knowledge, such as knowledge about how 
the U.S. system works, it is hard to say how these considerations change the 
balance.
31 
H.  Conclusion for domestic systems: 
The conclusion from the above analysis is that the major differences between 
quantity restrictions and taxes are all in the design of the systems rather than 
anything inherent in one or the other system. If we insist on the simple design 
imagined by Weitzman (a flat-rate tax fixed forever or hard quantity limit, fixed 
forever), then there are real differences and taxes likely dominate in the climate 
context. But these assumptions are inappropriate in the climate context. With 
more sophisticated design, the two are substantially equivalent, with differences 
relating to subtle questions such as political economy and the like.  
IV.  International systems 
The claim above was that within a single country, there are few differences 
between quantity restrictions and taxes because of design flexibility; claimed 
differences most often simply reflect unstated and incorrect assumptions about 
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design. Climate change, however, is a global problem, and a solution will require 
all major emitting nations to reduce emissions. The analysis changes for 
international systems. An internationally harmonized system requires the 
cooperation of multiple governments, raising costs of implementation. For 
example, compliance monitoring gets more expensive as more nations join an 
agreement. Similarly, hold-out problems in negotiating the agreement may limit 
the ability to make adjustments to the system later on, limiting flexibility. If the 
costs of implementation are higher and there is less flexibility in an international 
system, some of the conclusions above may not hold.  
Section A discusses the benefits of having an international regime. Section B 
examines whether the design flexibility available in a domestic regime is equally 
possible internationally, arguing that there will be less flexibility in international 
systems. Section C considers the problem of monitoring and enforcement in an 
international system, arguing that the problem of cheating is worse with permits 
than with taxes. Section D considers whether distributive issues are more easily 
solved with a cap and trade system.  
Before beginning the discussion, it is worth clarifying what internationally 
harmonized taxes and quantity limits might look like. In an internationally 
harmonized carbon tax, nations would have a tax with the same base and rate 
schedule, and the same or similar enforcement mechanisms. Rate adjustments 
would have to be coordinated. In an internationally harmonized cap and trade 
system, nations would have to agree to the same base and enforcement 
mechanism.
32 To ensure a common price, we would need cross-country trading of 
permits or have some other similar mechanism to achieve price consistency. In 
addition, we would need an initial global allocation of quantities to nations or 
polluters.
33 
 Another, perhaps more likely, possibility is a set of regional systems with 
coordination across regions. In such a system, regions would agree to harmonized 
systems within the region. Across regions, there might be coordination 
                                                 
32 Generally, we refer to tax systems with the same rate, base, and other parameters has 
harmonized and quantity systems in which polluters can buy and sell permits in a single, 
international market as integrated. I will use the terms interchangeably. 
33 With taxes, the allocation is implicit – each nation keeps its own tax revenues. The allocation 
could be made explicit for taxes just like for quantity restrictions by having payments of tax 
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mechanisms, such as allowing credit in one region for reductions in other regions. 
VATs and income taxes might be examples, where there is substantial 
coordination across systems, but different rates and bases. The less coordination, 
the greater the potential will be for missing low-cost abatement opportunities. The 
discussion below considers the problem of instrument choice when there are a 
large number of participating nations; this can be taken to be either a global 
system or a regional system. 
A.  The Benefits of Coordination 
While it is possible, and perhaps likely, that nations or regions will have 
separate systems with perhaps some coordination between them, there are likely 
significant benefits to a fully harmonized system. In a fully harmonized system, 
all nations, and all polluters in those nations would face the same set of prices. A 
uniform, global price for carbon dioxide means that the lowest cost abatement 
opportunities will be pursued regardless of location. If nations or regions have 
separate systems with differing prices, marginal abatement costs will not be 
equalized and some higher cost abatement options will be pursued at the expense 
of lower cost options. Depending on how different the prices are across regions 
and how different the abatement opportunities in each region are, the efficiency 
gains to harmonization may be substantial.  
Analysts have estimated the cost of pursuing climate change using a subset of 
countries. Zhang (2003), for example, considered the costs of meeting the Kyoto 
targets with and without trading across, in various permutations (i.e., no trading, 
only trading within Annex I, trading across all countries, etc.). The costs fall 
dramatically as more nations are included in the trading regime, dropping by more 
than 93% from the “no-trading” case to the “trading across all countries” case. 
When considering the size of the global restructuring needed to reduce carbon 
emissions, these savings are large indeed. Other studies have found similar 
results.
34 
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this question. When trading across regions is not permitted, the costs of meeting the Kyoto 
requirements range from around $200/ton for the US to $400/ton for Japan, with the EU in the 
middle, at $305/ton. When trading is allowed within the developed countries, the average drops to 
$77/ton. If trading is allowed globally, the average drops to $36/ton. Stevens and Rose (2002) 
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There are similar estimates of gains from allowing trading within a single 
country or region. Ellerman and Harrison (2003), for example, estimate the 
abatement cost savings from trading in the U.S. sulfur dioxide system as 
compared to a regulatory system without trading. Over the 13 year period from 
1995 to 2007, they estimate that the total savings is 57% of the cost without 
trading – the trading system costs less than half. Similarly Burtraw and Mansur 
(1999) find health related benefits of $124 million in 2005 (in 1995 dollars) from 
the trading of sulfur permits compared to a no-trading baseline, which is large 
given the size of the program. 
B.  Flexibility 
The discussion above argued that the Weitzman analysis of the differences 
between quantity restrictions and taxes inappropriately relied on an assumption of 
limited flexibility both in adjusting to new information over time and in the 
complexity of the systems. The question is the extent to which these arguments 
carry over to the international context. I break the discussion into the same two 
pieces as Part II above: adjusting to new information and complexity of the 
schedules. 
1.  Adjustments based on new information.  
Taxes. Achieving agreement in the international context is more difficult than 
in the domestic context because of the hold-out problem. It would be infeasible to 
renegotiate a climate treaty each time rates needed to be adjusted.  
We can imagine an entity like the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, or the 
International Panel on Climate Change being delegated task of adjusting tax rates. 
To avoid giving international bureaucrats too much discretion over national 
policies, the entity could be given a formula to use in making its decisions, so that 
they would be based on evidence rather than political views. Nations might have 
opt-out options or provisions to review the adjustments.  
While possible, such a delegation would be an extraordinary change from the 
current environment. Nations have not regularly agreed to delegate tax rates to 
international bodies. Even within the EU nations have freedom regarding tax 
rates. An international body would inevitably have considerable discretion 
because of the complexity of the task. In addition, nations would have to agree to 40 
 
tax rate adjustments if emissions are higher or lower than expected, which means 
that they would have to agree that their domestic tax rate would go up if 
emissions in other countries were higher than expected. Nations may not readily 
agree to such a system, particularly if cheating is a problem. (Cheating is 
addressed in Section B.)  
Permits. Permits present similar problems. Because of the difficulties of 
negotiation, adjusting the number of permits in response to new information 
would probably require delegation much like a tax would. It is not clear that the 
problems would be any different. Nations would still have to delegate fiscal 
policy to an international body with discretion to make adjustments.  
Summary. There is likely to be less flexibility to adjust to new information in 
the international than in the domestic context. Nations would have to agree to 
delegating tax rates or quantity restrictions to an international organization. There 
would be no way to force hold-outs to agree to such a delegation. If a major 
emitter did not want such a delegation, nothing could be done. In the domestic 
context, legislatures typically have majority rule voting procedures, so hold-outs 
have less power. This is at least one reason we see few examples of substantial 
delegation of authority in the international context and none like central banks, 
unlike in the domestic context where they are common. Therefore, it is likely that 
rate or quantity adjustments would be slower internationally than domestically.  
2.  Complex Schedules.  
Taxes. In principle, there would be no problems with imposing a nonlinear tax 
in an international, harmonized system. Even if nations are unlikely to delegate 
the setting of tax rates for an international body, they might agree up front to a tax 
rate schedule that mimics the expected marginal harm from emissions. There is no 
reason to believe that the problem of holdouts means simpler schedules; the need 
to satisfy everyone in a negotiation may lead to more complex schedules or 
simpler schedules, and it hard to say in advance which way it cuts. 
The only real issue would be same issue that arises for tax rate adjustments: 
whether nations would agree to allow their rate to increase because of excess 
emissions elsewhere. In the case of a pre-set, complex tax schedule, the rate 
increase would happen automatically under a formula, but the issue would be the 
same. Excess emissions by one nation force others to raise their rates. 41 
 
Permits. Nations could just as easily agree to a complex system of quantity 
restrictions as they could to a complex tax schedule. The problem with complex 
quantity schedules comes at the implementation stage. Consider a quantity 
restriction with a cap and a floor on the trading price of the permits. If the permit 
prices get above a ceiling, new permits would be issued. If they were auctioned, 
nations would have to agree to the allocation of the revenue. If the permit prices 
were to go below a floor, the price would have to be supported through a purchase 
of permits. Nations would have to agree on who would pay for the purchase.  
In principle, the allocation of these costs and benefits is no different from the 
allocation of other costs and benefits in a treaty generally. We can imagine a 
nation or group of nations setting up an international fund with the role of 
enforcing a price floor and having the right to sell permits to create a price ceiling. 
Or, if we use a Roberts and Spence-type mechanism, the entity would buy and sell 
options on permits. This seems more plausible than an international body using its 
discretion to set tax rates or quantities based on new information. Nevertheless, 
caps and floors may be more difficult to implement than in the domestic context. 
For example, if the price of permits drops because of cheating by a nation or set 
of nations, other nations might be unwilling to pay to support a price floor.  
Yet another alternative is to design self-adjusting permits. Given emissions in 
the prior period, permits would adjust to allow a different amount of emissions in 
the current period based on a formula designed to keep the price near the marginal 
benefit of abatment. 
Summary. Complex schedules are not as easy to implement in the 
international context as domestically. Nevertheless, complex schedules seem 
more feasible internationally than frequent tax rate or quantity adjustments based 
on new information.  
3.  Conclusion 
Flexibility will be somewhat more difficult in the international context than 
domestically. Delegation to an agency with discretion seems unlikely but complex 
rate or quantity schedules may be feasible. Nevertheless, the optimal schedule 
may be relatively simple and the optimal timing of adjustments infrequent. It is 
not clear that a well-designed international regime would not have sufficient 42 
 
flexibility to make the Weitzman-type differences between taxes and quantity 
restrictions second order.  
C.  Rogue regimes 
Nordhaus (2007) argues that the problem of rogue countries is a strong reason 
for favoring taxes. The argument is that in a cap and trade regime, countries have 
an incentive cheat by not monitoring domestic emissions and selling their 
allocation of permits in the international markets. Nordhaus gives the example of 
Nigeria, which Nordhaus puts as having emissions of around 100 million tons per 
year.
35 If it were allocated permits equal to its recent emissions – 100 million tons 
– and could sell them for $20 per ton, Nigeria would receive $2 billion of foreign 
currency per year, which is more than three times the size of its non-oil exports. 
Taxes, Nordhaus argues, would create less of an incentive to cheat because 
countries cheating on carbon taxes would be giving up revenue. This section 
compares the problem of cheating under taxes and permits.  
As discussed by Hovi and Holtsmark (2006), the sale of the permits by a 
rogue country would increase total emissions. The rogue country would have 
business as usual emissions instead of the capped amount. In addition, the rest of 
the world would have an increase in the number of permits equal to those 
allocated to the rogue country. The net would be an increase in global emissions 
(above the agreed cap) equal to the business as usual emissions in rogue country 
(there would be permits equal the agreed amount plus the additional business as 
usual emissions in the rogue country). So, in the case of Nigeria, there would be 
100 million tons of additional emissions above whatever had been agreed to. 
The problem of rogue countries is different in a tax regime. With permits, the 
rogue country exploits the rest of the world by failing to enforce. With taxes, if 
the rogue country does not enforce the rules, it loses tax revenue. To be sure, there 
is a net gain for failing to enforce a tax. Taxing emissions reduces the externality 
domestic polluters impose on the world; failing to enforce the tax allows domestic 
polluters to impose that externality, producing a local gain. But the gain is smaller 
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emissions, Nigeria has just under 300 million tons of emissions, making it the 25
th highest emitting 
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than with permits because with permits, the rogue country gets hard currency in 
addition imposing an externality on the rest of the world. 
Similarly, the increase in emissions is lower with rogue countries under a tax 
than under a quantity restriction. The increase will only be equal to the difference 
between emissions with a tax and without in the rogue country. Emissions in the 
rest of the world are unaffected (leaving aside the problem of carbon leakage).  
The extent of the advantage for taxes because of this problem depends on the 
ability to monitor emissions and enforce agreed caps. If there were sufficient 
ability to monitor and flexibility to adjustment the regimes once cheating is 
detected, the two systems would be equivalent. This follows in a straightforward 
way from the discussion in the domestic context: if cheating causes emissions or 
permit prices to vary from expected amounts, the system can be adjusted to keep 
the price close to the marginal benefit of abatement. As long as there is sufficient 
flexibility in making adjustments, the two systems are functionally the same. 
We do not have experience with a similar system to know how well 
monitoring will work and to some extent it depends on technology. For nations 
that do not produce substantial amounts of fossil fuels, we may be able to monitor 
imports of fossil fuels and infer compliance. If states produce fossil fuels, we 
would have to be able to measure production (as well as imports and exports) to 
determine compliance. This may be possible but if permit prices were high, 
incentives to cheat would also be high. Finally, satellites may soon be able to 
monitor local emissions, providing a method of monitoring that might be difficult 
to evade.
36  
We also would need to design an enforcement mechanism once a cheater is 
caught. For some countries, trade sanctions or similar measures may work, but for 
others this many not be sufficient or, because they export an important product, 
may be unlikely to be imposed. Victor (2001) and Keohane and Raustiala (2008) 
argue that buyer liability – a system in which buyers cannot use permits if the 
seller is found to be in violation – work because they create a market-based 
enforcement incentive. Such a system, however, would still ultimately rely on ex 
post political enforcement against rogue countries to declare the permits invalid. 
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A related alternative is to prohibit the future use of rogue country permits, thereby 
limiting the effects of cheating to a single or perhaps small number of periods. 
Taxes have their own monitoring problems. As Victor (2001) has argued, to 
determine compliance with an internationally harmonized tax system, we would 
have to be able to look at a countries entire set of taxes and subsidies to see 
whether the tax is offset elsewhere in the system with subsidies. That is, a country 
could have a nominal tax but elsewhere offer an offsetting subsidy so that there is 
no net tax. Reporting of all net taxes and subsidies to an international body would 
be required. Emissions monitoring through satellite technology – a potentially 
promising approach for quantity targets – would not be helpful.  
Enforcement problems once a cheater is caught might be more difficult in a 
tax system. With a cap and trade system, use of rogue country permits can be 
prohibited. There is no similar option for taxes. 
To summarize, the incentives to cheat are greater and the effects of cheating 
worse in a cap and trade regime than in a tax regime. If good monitoring systems 
are available, such as accurate accounting for fossil fuel consumption or satellite 
tracking of emissions, the problems of cap and trade systems relative to taxes are 
reduced because enforcement might be easier in a cap and trade system than in a 
tax. 
D.  Baselines, Distribution 
Nordhaus (2007) also argues that a disadvantage of a cap and trade system 
is that it will likely require a set of baselines to determine targets, such as 20% of 
emissions in 1990 by 2050. Establishing baselines, he argues, will be complex 
and controversial. In a tax system, all we need is the rate structure, making a tax 
system easier to establish. It is not clear that this argument is correct. 
Establishing baselines is the same as determining total emissions by each 
country: y% of a given year emissions by a target date can be translated into x 
million tons of carbon dioxide by the same target date. So long as the percentages 
of the baseline can be varied, the baseline year itself does not matter, and vice 
versa. All that really matters is the total emissions allowed for each country in 
each year or over the set period. Because emissions permits would be traded 45 
 
internationally, the initial allocation does not have direct efficiency effects;
37 the 
allocation primarily determines the distributional effects of the system.  
Tax systems, or at least tax systems in which each country keeps its own 
tax receipts, have an assumed distributional effect. It is equivalent to one where 
permits are allocated based on business as usual emissions. Tax systems do not 
avoid the distributional problems. If countries object to the implicit distribution in 
a tax system, they will demand side payments or the like necessary to agree a 
treaty. Whatever problems there are in determining who gets what in a cap and 
trade system will not go away because of a change in the method of regulating 
emissions.  
The alternative view is that permits help with distributional issues because 
it will be easier to buy off nations with permits than to make the same side 
payments directly. Commentators such as Stewart and Wiener (2003) argue that a 
treaty is, therefore, more likely with permits than with taxes. The problem with 
this argument is the same as the problem with the Nordhaus argument in reverse. 
Whatever the distributional problems, they do not change because of the choice of 
instruments. Moreover, the massive distributional issues cannot be hidden through 
the choice of instruments. Nations will easily be able to determine who is paying 
what regardless of which instrument is chosen. 
One possibility, similar to the framing discussion above, is that the explicit 
allocation of permits will appear different to negotiators and their home country 
constituents than the implicit allocation in a tax. Many people have an intuition 
that emissions permits should be allocated to all individuals in the world on a per 
capita basis (based on the idea that all people have an equal right to the 
atmosphere) but at the same time have an intuition that countries would keep the 
taxes that they raise. These two intuitions are inconsistent. Because of these 
inconsistent intuitions, the end result distribution the extent of purely 
distributional bargaining might be different in the two systems. Framing might 
matter. Nevertheless, given the size of the issue, it seems unlikely that anyone 
would be fooled. At the end of the day, there are enormous distributional issues in 
                                                 
37 There may be efficiency effects related to the transition between regimes. These transition 
issues should not be minimized. If permits are allocated based on business as usual projections, 
countries will have an incentive to increase emissions prior to the treaty. See Kaplow (2008) for a 
discussion. 46 
 
a climate treaty, and they cannot be avoided through the choice of regulatory 
instruments. 
V.  Conclusion 
Discussions of instrument choice almost always have strong assumptions 
about design. Taxes are normally taken to be fixed, per-unit charges and cap and 
trade systems are taken to have annual, hard caps on emissions, perhaps 
sometimes with limited additional flexibility, such as banking and limited 
borrowing or a safety valve. These assumptions are not justified in the climate 
context. Other differences, such as distributional or revenue differences are also 
based on assumptions about design that are unlikely to hold in the domestic 
context. 
Rather than focusing on instrument choice, a better focus is on the design 
of whichever instrument is chosen. A casual glance as existing or proposed 
climate change regimes indicates that much work needs to be done. The EU cap 
and trade system, for example, covers only a modest fraction of emissions, had 
freely allocated permits, and includes an unadministrable offset program. Most 
proposals seriously considered by the United States Congress have similar 
problems and in addition, embed within them massive command and control 
regulations. The gains from improving the design of these systems likely 
massively outweigh the gains from the choice of instruments.    47 
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